



THE New Republic

**Bumps and Ruts
on Stevenson's
Campaign Trail**

PAGE 3

THE PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT

**A recommendation that
the US advance beyond
the goal of inspection
and state its terms for
ending the arms race.**

PAGES 10-16

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Washington Wire T.R.B.

Probably the best service that could be done for Adlai Stevenson now would be to tell him what was wrong with his 1952 campaign. It was a sloppy job. Stevenson was surrounded by amateurs; his press service was a washout, and he seemed to be almost insulated from the kind of professional advice he needed most. Assuming he can get nominated next summer, Stevenson stands a good chance of losing the election a second time if he hasn't the capacity to learn.

This does not mean to criticize the "high level" approach of Stevenson, or the wit that is as natural to him as his sensitive feeling for words. Stevenson would ruin himself if he ever tried the give-em-hell technique. For better or worse, Stevenson is a man with a conscience who would rather lose an election than debase himself; we think that is one of his greatest assets and a reason for winning, not losing.

But a machine may have a fine motor and not perform well because of faulty adjustments. The attention to humdrum details of the Stevenson organization in 1952 was flagrantly deficient. Operating everything out of the little town of Springfield, Illinois, in itself seemed downright stupid. Co-ordination with state groups was faulty. We have never yet heard a reporter say anything good about the handling of press relations. This is not a hard thing to remedy: Averell Harriman has Charles Vandevanter and Roger Tubby; the White House has Jim Hagerty, who is tops in his profession; Franklin Roosevelt had Steve Early—but nobody of this caliber and experience was in the Stevenson ménage.

It was surprising to find out how many reporters in 1952 secretly favored Stevenson. They fought against being moved out of Springfield to join Ike. The crowds liked Ike because they heard him only once, but the reporters got almost unbearably bored with the same sermonettes day after day on The Great Crusade. It led to the tortured journalistic comment when Ike's party entered Oregon,

"We have just crossed the 42nd latitude." Stevenson, by contrast, was wonderfully fresh and stimulating, with wit and imagination and occasionally real oratorical magnificence. But you could hear the Stevenson organization creaking at the seams all the time. It was a bush-league circuit, and there was no reason for it.

Nationally syndicated columnist Tom Stokes arrived at Madison Square Garden on one occasion to hear Stevenson speak and asked for a badge. "Sorry, the badges have been left at Springfield by mistake." New York cops are tough, and a reporter needs credentials. Nobody around headquarters seemed to have authority to give Stokes a badge, or, indeed, to know who he was. It practically took a council of war to get him in.

Every Presidential candidate needs a Brain Trust, and Stevenson had a good one, but he also needs men with practical political savvy and a knowledge of first names. FDR had Jim Farley, Tom Dewey had some of the slickest operators in the business, but Stevenson seemed to operate pretty much on his own. Wilson Wyatt did what he could to help.

There was little co-ordination between the Truman cavalcade in 1952 and the Stevenson trips. The GOP press gleefully threw its spotlight on rampaging Harry and ignored Adlai. Whether the Truman safari did the Democratic Presidential candidate any good on the national level it is hard to say, though it undoubtedly helped individual local candidates.

Probably Stevenson never had a chance anyway. But next year the Democrats could win, though it will be no walk-away. Even though Ike doesn't run, his image will be bright, and besides that the country is at peace and prosperous. So the average voter may well ask, "Why change?" The Democratic Party deserves a candidate who can give a literate answer to that question and besides that organize an effective team in the intricate

election game. If he cannot achieve this in the campaign, he is not likely to be a very successful President.

News from the GOP stable of dark horses: A boom for Paul Hoffman will be launched from Chicago at the appropriate time. . . . Another name often mentioned is Milton Eisenhower. Trouble with him, like Hoffman, is that he is thought of as a liberal. Milton came to Washington as assistant to Agriculture Secretary Jardine in the Coolidge Administration, which was conservative enough for anybody, but then he stayed on with the unspeakable Henry Wallace. The Old Guard finds it hard to stomach that. Milton also seems to have been associated professionally with another young administrator of those days — Alger Hiss. . . . We note with pleasure that nobody has revived the name of Attorney General Brownell as a possible candidate, though when he joined the Cabinet from the Dewey camp there were knowing nods about his later availability. Apparently Brownell's use of the FBI files to attack Truman's loyalty through the Harry Dexter White case removed his name even from discussion. . . . Some Democrats, meanwhile, are facetiously proposing to pick William O. Douglas if the Republicans choose Warren; the idea is that it would be a nice all-Supreme-Court election that would take the politics out of politics.

Secretary of Agriculture Benson is causing GOP top leaders a good deal of worry. He is an idealistic man motivated by deep moral beliefs that make him, in this respect, curiously like Henry Wallace. The Cabinet found him all right to have around when Ike was there to back him, and the farmers blamed Benson, not Ike, for their steadily falling prices. But now Ike is confined to bed, and a big farm revolt is brewing. Benson may be persuaded to add a few gadgets to his program, but he will quit rather than yield on basic principles. It is hard to see any relief for farmers while Benson is in office, or hard to see any relief for fellow Cabinet members while Ike is in retirement. Personally, we can't help sympathizing a bit with Benson. "Can't you put just a teeny-weensy bit of politics into your program?" the others keep asking him. "No," Secretary Benson keeps answering with a beatific smile.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Bumps and Ruts on the Stevenson Trail

ADLAI STEVENSON's empty bandwagon—though not carrying a declared candidate—has plunged into a rough stretch of road. Two jolts sent the wagon careening, but some smart drivers from Texas have applied steadiness to the reins.

1. Stevenson missed fire in his discussion of the farm issue at Green Bay, Wisconsin, October 8, because he evaded a stand. That is the consensus of Midwest Democratic farm leaders who were asked their opinion in a telephone poll conducted by Democratic campaign leaders from Washington. These farm leaders are shaking their heads at Stevenson because they believe the Democrats should make easy gains in the farm vote if only they avoid booboos. They want Stevenson to be a sharp farm politician; he is trying to be a careful student of farm economics. They think he should avoid the farm question now or pledge greater assistance. At Green Bay he did neither. Stevenson's major opponents, Gov. Averell Harriman of New York and Sen. Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, are both preparing to capitalize on this weakness in Stevenson's position. The sudden neutrality of Harry Truman in the Democratic race also seems related to Stevenson and the farm problem.

2. California Democratic leaders, who declared themselves publicly for Stevenson during the recent California visit of Harriman's campaign manager, Carmine De Sapio, have apparently forced Stevenson into a California primary battle with Senator Kefauver, a development which the Stevenson headquarters had sought to avoid. Kefauver's folksy town-to-town campaigning has many advantages over Stevenson's major addresses in key cities. And the California June primary is a rich stake, not only binding upon the large bloc of California delegates at the convention, but affording national publicity to the candidates only 60 days before the nomination. Unless Stevenson can make an exceptionally strong showing in California, he will be disadvantaged at the convention. He must now rethink his strategy on primaries.

3. Counteracting these jolts, Stevenson has won reluctant but firm pledges of support from two key Southerners—Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and House Speaker Sam Rayburn, both of whom believe that Governor Harriman would stir up the same bitter Dixiecrat revolt which beleaguered Truman in 1948. Senator Johnson pledged his support when Stevenson visited Johnson's Texas ranch in early October. Sam Rayburn, who was also present at the ranch, made his decision even more recently. Neither has yet made public his decision. These two men can do more than any other two Southerners to line up a solid South for Stevenson at the convention.

What Stevenson said in a speech before the Wisconsin Democratic State Convention at Green Bay made sense, but he did not give farm leaders confidence that he believed in doing something now about the farmer's plight. He called it "unfair that farmers, alone among the great economic groups in our country, are not sharing in the current prosperity." He blasted the Republican policy of sliding supports for farm prices because "instead of eliminating surpluses, as advertised, it eliminates farmers." But when it came to positive proposals, Stevenson eschewed promises, threw a left-handed slap at those who recommend only 90 percent parity supports, hinted that he might favor a system of production payments (a system advocated by the Farmer's Union).

This speech would not have caused the stir it did if it were not for Stevenson's past record. Stevenson irritated the Midwest farm leaders in 1952 with his reluctance to make commitments on the farm problem. They say he made a poorer showing among farmers than Truman did in 1948, and contributed to the Eisenhower sweep in the farm states. Democratic farm leaders were therefore watching to see what Stevenson had learned in the last three years.

The importance to the Democrats of the farm vote lies in the fact that farmers

now make up 13 percent of the population, are earning only 6 percent of the national income, yet control nearly a third of the Presidential electors because of the strength of the 16 states in which agriculture is the principal industry.

Stevenson's advisers are urging him to make another speech within the next 30 days, in which he would propose emergency support to raise farm incomes immediately, after which long-range solutions can be worked out with greater deliberation. But there is no indication that he is ready to accept this advice.

Key agricultural leaders of the Truman Administration have been privately critical of Stevenson, and in constant touch with their old chief, Harry Truman. It is assumed they had much to do with Truman's recent declaration of neutrality in the Democratic race, a declaration which assumed double significance when it was made in Albany.

Truman's role is likely to remain benign unless the former President is angered by innuendo from the Stevenson camp. An unnamed Stevenson aide was quoted in the *New York Times* on October 17 as saying of Mr. Truman's swing away from Stevenson: "We had him last time—they can have him this time." This was a paraphrase of Churchill's famous quip about Italy serving the allied powers in World War I and the Axis in World War II.

These developments have sharpened the competition for the Democratic nomination. Governor Harriman is delivering a major farm address to a Democratic money-raising rally at Des Moines on October 22. Advance information is that, with drafting help from some important former Fair Dealers, he will resurrect the Brannan Plan, urge restoring 90 percent supports, and renew the plea for aid to marginal farmers.

And Kefauver told his first press conference since returning from Asia that he is for restoration of 90 percent price supports until something better can be devised for the farmer.

Stevenson's decision on the primaries is complicated by the new Kefauver

strategy. The Senator returned from Asia to find Governor Harriman already sparing cautiously with Stevenson. Kefauver therefore decided not to announce his candidacy at this time, recalling 1952 when he wore himself out as an early front runner, only to fall short at the tape. It is generally expected that he will announce shortly before the New Hampshire primary in March, and campaign actively in at least three or four states.

When Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn made their decision for Stevenson, they paid indirect tribute to three years of Southern missionary work by Stevenson's two national chairmen, Stephen Mitchell and Paul Butler. Both men have plugged Stevenson's Kentucky ancestry and his understanding of the South. Stevenson's big advantage over Harriman in the South is often expressed by the phrase that Adlai is a "reasonable man," by which the Southerner means that he is a gradualist on the race question. Harriman, it will be recalled, won the 1952 Democratic primary in the District of Columbia by pledging immediate integration in the schools.

It is thus clear that by the time Stevenson formally announces his candidacy in November, some of the major power groups in the Democratic Party will already have gravitated to particular candidates—many of the farm leaders to Harriman, most of the Southern leaders to Stevenson. But the equation is still in doubt.

Britain's Conservatives: Enthusiasm Is Muted

THE Conservative Party Conference is a mass demonstration, not a policy-making body. Its four thousand members meet for only two and a half days, and their Party Leader, in whom sole responsibility for policy and organization is vested by their constitution, does not even appear on the scene until the Conference itself is formally concluded. None the less, the Conference is a useful sounding-board for the militant Conservatives who are the backbone of the party's election machine.


This year the most significant development brought to light by the Conference was a marked decline in the popularity of the Chancellor, "Rab" Butler, whom many have seen as a successor to Eden in the near future. He was much criticized from the floor and the tone and content of his reply plunged many of his hearers into irritable gloom. He is now compelled to admit that his spring budget was an election bribe which did real damage to the British economy. By releasing £130 in tax reliefs at a time when Britain's trade balance was seriously deteriorating he not only stimulated inflation but still further discouraged the lazy businessman from seeking markets abroad. As a result the situation is much worse, and world confidence in sterling is badly shaken.

Most economists feel that some physical control of spending is now essential. But since any physical control of private

spending is contrary to the whole Conservative philosophy, Butler can only turn to cuts in public spending. And he has made it clear that, as usual, defense and social services will bear the brunt. A cut in housing subsidies has already been forecast, and the Minister of Education has stated that housing will no longer be the first priority of the Conservative Government.

In the past, a Conservative Party Conference might have greeted such news with stoicism if not enthusiasm. But the Conservative Party today owes its recovery precisely to the fact that it has begun to reach out into social strata which benefit directly from the Welfare State. Indeed one observer at Bournemouth was heard to wonder, as he listened to the speeches from the floor, whether he had strayed into the Labor Party Conference by mistake.

To this disillusionment with Butler's economic policy came a grave disappointment at Eden's decision to leave the present Cabinet team unaltered for the time being. In addition to some notoriously weak men, there are some Ministers who have long talked in public about their yearning to retire. Unwilling Ministers are not likely to be good Ministers, and meanwhile able backbenchers are straining to take their place. Many of these aspirants are Butler's young men, and it may be that his present decline in popularity has also dimmed their stars.



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Volume 133, Number 17, Issue 2135	
<i>Washington Wire</i> , by T.R.B.....	2
<i>Behind the Headlines</i>	3
<i>Clean-cut Reformers of Philadelphia</i>	7
by James Reichley	
<i>The Prospect for Disarmament</i>	10
<i>A Proposal for Total, Universal Disarmament</i>	12
by Charles G. Bolte	
<i>Books and Comment</i>	17
<i>Television</i>	21
<i>Theatre</i>	22
<i>Correspondence</i>	23

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Somehow the government failed entirely at Bournemouth to win any credit for its handling of foreign affairs. Moreover, the Conference found the government's decision not to cut the two-year conscription period a crushing blow. But when all this has been said, the fact remains that a government with a majority like Eden's can afford to be unpopular in its first two years of office. And the disappointment of the Conservatives is mitigated by their feeling that the Labour Party does not yet provide the country with a serious alternative. Eden voiced a widely held view when he ended his speech by saying: "You will notice that I have not mentioned the words socialism or nationalism. Truth to tell, I think they are just a little bit out of date."

London

DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

End of a Push-Button Majority in the UN

UNITED STATES leadership in the past has been able to roll up majorities on any issue it felt keenly about in the United Nations Assembly. Now, in the present session, it is suffering some stunning defeats.

The first defeat came on the Algerian item where the United States earned the bitter antagonism of both sides. The colonial powers hold the US delegation responsible for the narrow defeat France experienced on the issue; the anti-colonial majority criticize us for having voted with France.

Undaunted—or unaware—the United States delegation next pressed an all-out drive to elect the Philippines to the Security Council seat originally allocated to East Europe. Our candidate, declared the US spokesman Henry Cabot Lodge,



Jr., had "a good chance to go over on the first ballot." But Western Europe, which did not want to see the seat go to Asia, teamed up with

the Soviet bloc while Asian countries also fought the Philippine candidacy on the ground that this was not the way to gain the increased representation that they desire.

A third, still more serious setback, may well be in the making in the atoms-for-peace discussion. Here the good will initially created by the initiative of President Eisenhower is turning to resentment. There is widespread opposition, especially among the underdeveloped countries, to the US attempt to keep the UN at arms length from the proposed international atoms-for-peace agency. For the US is insisting that the latter's relationship with the UN be that of a "specialized agency" and that the relationship be negotiated only *after* it has been established by chief atomic powers.

Our main reason for insisting on this awkward procedure is fear of Senator Bricker and his friends who have warned the State Department that the Agency will have hard sledding in the Senate if it is under the aegis of the UN. But since Soviet Russia is likely in any case to be a founding member of the agency, sensitivity to Republican fears of Communist contagion carries little weight.

The underdeveloped countries, for whose ostensible benefit the plan was designed, regard the draft statute circu-

lated by the US as a plan for controlling rather than helping their atomic development. Their drive to give the Assembly a determined voice over the Agency stems from their feeling that this will provide some safeguards against great power domination. And, of course, the have-not nations are in a substantial majority in the Assembly. On this issue, ironically, the Soviet Union which is a "have" nation in nuclear energy, has landed squarely on the side of the US. Soviet support, in the opinion of some observers, alone saved the US from a public drubbing as humiliating as that on the elections to the Security Council.

The Russian decision did not occasion much surprise. A similar tendency has been evident in the disarmament subcommittee where the almost exclusive preoccupation of the Russians and Americans with each other sometimes gives the other three members the feeling of being intruders. The course of these debates suggests that today the primary objective of the Kremlin is a settlement with the United States. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union will not take advantage of any weakness and division within the West to consolidate its growing influence among the underdeveloped nations. The all-out assault on the colonial powers now being mounted by the Bandung nations is quietly but effectively abetted by the Soviet delegation. And, given the failure of US leadership, no counter-influence to restore harmony within the UN is yet in sight. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld senses that the UN itself is in danger if the relationship between the sections of the Charter which call for self-determination and those that forbid intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction is not clarified. His fears led him to intervene in the dispute, only to hear himself denounced as a stooge for the colonial powers.

United Nations

JOSEPH P. LASH

Where Power Lies

THE MAN who does most to make the power policy of the Administration now admits that he kept secret for more than a month a Justice Department opinion that he has been on the verge of violating federal law. The admission came as Fred G. Aandahl, Assistant Secretary

of the Interior, was being pressed by a House Subcommittee on Public Works and Resources, headed by Rep. Earl Chudoff (D, Pa.), to explain why rural electric co-ops and municipalities in Georgia have not been getting their share of power from Clark Hill Dam.

Since Teddy Roosevelt's days, non-commercial users of electricity—"preference" groups—have been legally entitled to first tap of all federal power. Thirty-six such consumer groups have been stymied in Georgia, however, by the refusal of the Georgia Power Co., which owns the power lines that run from the dam to their farms, to "wheel" government power; the Department of the Interior, for its part, has declined to ask Congress for money to build a government transmission line and so deprive the utility company of its monopoly.

For months Interior has been pressuring the preference customers—organized into the Georgia Electric Membership Corp.—to agree to a contract whereby the private company would buy all the federal power outright and resell some of it to co-ops and municipalities. This would have permitted the utility to impose provisions in the contract restricting the growth and activities of the preference customers. GEMC has refused, contending that such a deal would be a violation of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the latest law to guarantee its members first chance at federally-produced power. Their protests were strong enough to bring on several White House conferences and a request by Interior to the Justice Department to hand down an opinion on the subject. Attorney General Brownell gave his opinion in August, stating that Interior's effort to push the co-ops into a deal with Georgia Power "flouts the Congressional purpose." For six weeks Mr. Aandahl kept this reply secret—due, he explained, to "an absence of an affirmative opinion to publicize"—and continued his efforts to give the private utility title to federal power.

With these Washington hearings, the Chudoff subcommittee is concluding a three-month investigation into the effects of the Administration's power policies on rural electric co-ops and municipalities around the country. Its first stop was Springfield, Mo., where more than a dozen witnesses told of the obstacles public agencies and REA co-ops are encountering in obtaining federal power;

preferential treatment, these persons contended, was being accorded private companies in the area. Co-op spokesmen in Colorado complained that the Rural Electrification Administration had forced them into partnership with a private utility as the condition of getting a badly needed loan. Northern California municipalities reported that they are faced with a 30-percent increase in their electric rates because federal power has been denied them and sold instead to the Pacific Gas and Electric Co. Witnesses in Idaho attacked the Bonneville Power Administration for its friendliness toward the Idaho Power Co. and its coolness toward preference customers.

These examples and others like them have served to define what this Administration calls its policy of "partnership" in power, as interpreted by Fred Aandahl, who views TVA as a "federal socialistic monopoly."

Dixon-Yates Ambush

THE DIXON-YATES story resembles one of those Saturday afternoon serials that used to keep us returning breathless to the Bijou each week. Last week, AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, one of the sponsors of the original Dixon-Yates-Wenzell negotiation, reversed his field and announced that settlement of the canceled contract is being held up because of "questions of possible conflict of interest" stemming from disclosures before the Kefauver committee (NR, July 18). Strauss was thus following the advice of the General Accounting Office to go slow on paying the Dixon-Yates claims in case the government decides it wants to contest the contract's legality in the courts. As if it weren't difficult enough to tell the Indians from the cowboys at this point, the Securities and Exchange Commission has served notice on the Mississippi Valley Generating Co. it will be stopped from issuing any additional common stock until the government settles up.

At the week's end, Dixon and Yates, deserted by their Republican partners and faced with ambush by the hard-riding, straight-shooting Kefauver committee, were clinging tenaciously to the edge of the cliff. Three days after the Strauss announcement, Mr. E. H. Dixon declared that he still expects a settlement which will make his company "substantially whole from a standpoint of dollars."

The Men in the Plant and the Labor Merger

AMONG THE MOST prized benefits American workingmen have won from the combination of union protection, more automatic machinery and somewhat enlightened management is the chance to spend a substantial amount of time talking with one another. Conversations go on endlessly in the modern mill—between two men working together on an assembly line, between the latheman who has just turned off his machine and the next fellow who is still turning a piece, between the press operator and the electrician passing through the department on his way to a repair job.

But they almost never talk about the union; and when they do, it usually concerns local affairs. In times of what seems crisis to the rank and file—strikes, governmental elections, contests for local office—the union may claim a little more attention from its members. Otherwise they are content to pay their dues and gripe about alleged corruption.

Yet they exercise a seemingly passive but all-important power through a sort of spontaneous but widespread agitation which is communicated up the hierarchy by worried local and middle echelon union officials, and they veto anything they are really set against by failing to support it when the chips are down. In some unions such as the United Auto Workers there is a little more participation; in others like the Steelworkers there is less. But almost everywhere in American unionism the rank and file are content to let those men and women who want to go to meetings instead of bowling, or who want to hang around the hall instead of taking the family to a drive-in movie, do the worrying and the talking about union affairs.

Outside of that active core there is little talk today among the rank and file with respect to the forthcoming merger of the AFL and the CIO. For a week, two workers I know at US Steel's "big mill" in Gary, Indiana—the world's largest—tried to stir up some conversation on the subject. They got little response. Most of the men approve of what little they have heard (or paid attention to), or at least have no strong objections. Assuming that the merger will take place, that it will not make things worse and that it might be an improvement, they have put the subject largely out of mind.

For the leaders and the active core of

unionists who must do the job in each community, this passiveness is consent to full speed ahead. "Full speed" is, however, inevitably very slow, what with haggling over positions and properties and prerogatives. To understand just what is going on, one can imagine what would be involved, ideological differences to one side, in uniting the Democratic and Republican Parties in any two-party town, with all their factions and vested interests and personal animosities.


Yet plans are being completed to liquidate the separate offices in many state capitals and to open new ones which will be owned and operated by the new AFL-CIO. CIO county and city councils and their AFL opposites are engaged in the same processes. To the degree that the physical plant and the facilities become one—single headquarters, the same secretarial staffs, one operating budget—a practical link will be forged that can withstand much pulling and hacking at by the ambitious but practical men who usually head the American labor movement at the plant levels.

Local CIO leaders may talk about making the AFL modernize its services and outlook and abandon its discriminatory policies. AFL officials at the bottom of the pyramid may assert that they intend to take the edge off of CIO zealot-style politicking and sometimes bump-tious bargaining practices. And each may threateningly add a hearty "or else." But inertia is a wonderful thing. The merger movement is under way; its successful conclusion is accepted as a fact by most of the men in the mills. If something should happen now to disrupt or destroy it, the men would certainly begin to talk about it, and about those responsible. There are dangers in that for leaders who, in the last analysis, depend upon elections to hold their jobs.

Meanwhile, the buzz of conversation in the factories centers around those traditional and somehow always interesting topics to which workers are forever devoted—the job, sex, new cars, sports, the television shows they watch and the children they raise. And in the Northwest and Midwest now, as the countryside takes on autumn colors, they are talking about the hunting season which has begun or is about to open.

Gary, Indiana

WARNER BLOOMBERG



"City machines are done for. It's the honest face on television that counts."

Clean-cut Reformers of Philadelphia

by James Reichley

"THE stakes are very high," the Old Politician told me as we lunched on lobster salad and french-fried potatoes at McShea's Saloon one-half block off of Market Street in Philadelphia. We were discussing the coming mayoralty election on November 8 in that city in which the Democratic reform administration which captured City Hall four years ago will receive its first major test. "The Republican Organization," he continued, "may not be broken, but it's certainly pretty battered. A machine needs jobs to live, and those boys are getting hungry."

"They haven't had many city jobs to give out for four years," he explained, "and now with a Democratic Administration in Harrisburg they won't get anything from the state. The few openings that Eisenhower sent their way were used up long ago. If they don't get back the city patronage this time, they can't survive. That means that Philadelphia will begin to turn in regular Democratic majorities. Then you'll find that the Republicans will permanently lose control of the state. And without Pennsylvania, how can the Republican Party hold on to the White House?"


The Old Politician is an astute and tough-minded member of the Regular Democratic City Organization. The situation he described is indeed revolutionary in Pennsylvania politics. The state has been ruled since the Civil War by a mighty Republican machine which always based its strength on Philadelphia. For a time in the twenties and early thirties the Democratic Party in the city had sunk to the status of a phony organization, bought and paid for by the Republican City Committee. Even during the days of the New Deal the city was rarely cracked, except in Presidential years, by Democratic candidates.

James Reichley, who has contributed to several national periodicals, is now a graduate student at Harvard.

Then, beginning in 1947, two young Philadelphia lawyers named Richardson Dilworth and Joseph Sill Clark, both products of the city's ancestor-heavy Chestnut Hill set, began a series of campaigns against the Republican Administration. Taking over the leadership of the local Democratic Party more or less by default, they capitalized on a crop of scandals that at the time had normally complacent Republican city officials blowing their heads off just as though they had been living in Kansas City or Chicago. Dilworth was more eloquent during the early years, but in 1951 it was Joe Clark who was elected mayor of Philadelphia, the first Democrat to hold that office in 67 years.

On that happy occasion the famished Democratic precinct committeemen swarmed to City Hall. To their astonishment and despair they discovered that Clark regarded membership in the Democratic Organization or even, it seemed, residence in Philadelphia as virtual proof of disqualification for a job with the city. Dark stories began to circulate about intellectuals being flown in from Paris to fill clerical positions. One committeeman moved to Atlantic City and sent Clark a post card asking if he was now eligible for a city appointment.

Inevitably, a bitter wrangle began between Clark and the Democratic Organization that had come under the dominance of Representative William Green. Organization leaders, in 1954, joined with the Republican bosses on the city council to try and wreck the shiny new City Charter which had been the major achievement of Clark's administration. The raid on the charter was repulsed and Clark is now completing the most successful administration in the city's history. Green, however, was determined to deny Clark renomination, and the Mayor (who would like to try for Jim Duff's seat in the United States Senate next year) did not wish to become involved in a primary fight. Dilworth, who has established an excellent record as District Attorney for



Longstreth



Dilworth

Philadelphia County, was enlisted as a candidate acceptable to both factions, and swept through unopposed.

The Republican Organization at the same time was suffering an unprecedented defeat in its own party primary. Patronage hungry and badly split by a succession of feuds among the tribal bosses who rule the outlying wards and precincts of Philadelphia, the Organization had been an inviting target for a clubby group of Young Men in a Hurry who meet each other at cocktail parties in the Germantown and Chestnut Hill sections of the city. This group drew up a primary slate headed by W. Thacher Longstreth, a 35-year-old advertising salesman, Princeton graduate, and resident of Chestnut Hill who lives not far from Joe Clark.

Longstreth, whose political experience was pretty much limited to some time he spent on a sound truck making speeches for Eisenhower in 1952, soon discovered that he had wandered into the range of powerful and determined men. Pressure was exerted through his business and through personal friends to get him off the ballot. His running-mates decided that they were not interested in the fight for better government after all, and he soon found that he was heading a ticket that consisted entirely of himself.

Austin Meehan, a colorful character who likes to put away gallon containers of ice cream at a single sitting and the most formidable of the Republican bosses, took Longstreth to lunch and told him that if he withdrew the Organization would make him the biggest man in town. If he did not, then, Meehan added, the Organization would break him like a twig. To everyone's surprise Longstreth remained a candidate—"because," he explained, "I thought I was doing the right thing and I couldn't understand why so many people wanted me to stop doing the right thing, and also because I liked the publicity."

The public responded. Robert C. Duffy, chairman of the Republican City Committee, who had no particular ties with any of the great ward bosses, resigned his post and announced that he would campaign for Longstreth. Reports began to leak up from the precincts that various committeemen, sensing that a machine can-

didate would have little chance against Dilworth in November, were secretly planning to desert to the Insurgents. Finally, a few days before the primary, William Meade, Meehan's principal enemy within the Organization and, as Longstreth says, "the least politically honorable of the bosses," broke the concordat which had united the ward leaders and released his bloc of wards to the Insurgents. Longstreth, carrying all of the Meade wards plus the so-called independent wards in Germantown, was nominated by a large majority.

The Organization, though saddened by the passing of the grand old days when it could name candidates at will, assumed a collegiate air and settled down to fight the campaign under the banner of reform. The primary result was interpreted by the party regulars as being, in effect, a victory for the Meade faction over the Meehan faction. The regulars had, however, reckoned without two men: Longstreth and Meehan.

Three weeks after the primary, the Republican City Committee was scheduled to meet to elect a new city chairman. Duffy, with Meade's support, announced his candidacy for his old post, and it was assumed that he would be chosen as a matter of course. On the Sunday before the meeting, however, it was reported in the *Philadelphia Bulletin* that Meehan, having pondered the primary results, had decided that an entirely new face should be put on the Republican Party in Philadelphia and that he would support for the city chairmanship John Pomeroy, Longstreth's manager in the primary campaign. Pomeroy, a 29-year-old member of the state legislature who also lives in Chestnut Hill and who claims that he got into politics primarily to gather material for a doctoral thesis he is writing on Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, agreed to run.

STILL somewhat heady from his victory in the primary, Longstreth declared that if the ward leaders did not choose his friend, he would withdraw as Republican candidate for mayor. Duffy, who had been among the first of the regulars to desert to the Insurgents in the primary campaign, reacted like one who has been called a thief by the man whose life he has just saved. His old friends the ward leaders re-elected Duffy to the accompaniment of ill-natured reflections on the probable circumstances of Longstreth's birth. Pomeroy received the votes of Sheriff Meehan and of Mort Witkin, respectively the toughest and the shrewdest of the old bosses, and the two whom he and Longstreth had been most determined to remove from power.

Longstreth was now stuck with his promise to withdraw his candidacy if the City Committee refused Pomeroy's leadership. He filled out his withdrawal slip and carried it around in his pocket for two days. Phone calls poured into his home urging him to stay in the race. Duffy and the ward leaders would not back down. At last, Jay Cooke, the liaison man between Big Money and

the Republican Organization in the city, whom Longstreth could not even identify, called the disputants into his office and emerged with a solution. Longstreth had agreed to run as an independent Republican, completely divorced from the Organization, with Pomeroy as his manager and Cooke as chairman of an Advisory Committee. This apparently salved Longstreth's conscience, since, it was said, he was now completely separated from the ward bosses.

But was he? The Republican candidate's detractors claim that by failing to carry out the letter of his threat, Longstreth marched off down the road of compromise from which there is no turning. The bosses, it is true, are continuing to support him. "What else can they do?" asks Mort Witkin, perched in his office across from City Hall. "Where can Meehan go? Where can Meade go? Where can Mort Witkin go? Longstreth may be independent as a jaybird, but we have a full slate of candidates to elect and we're not going to make it unless we put him over too. This is our business."

SOMEWHAT shorn of the wool of innocence, Longstreth seems at times to believe that the only thing he has to do to win the election is to prove that he is a more charming fellow than Dilworth. He is none the less sincere. Like many prosperous young suburbanites throughout the nation, he has a hankering to align himself with the political and economic principles of the Republican Party, while at the same time supporting honest and humane government which some members of an older generation of Republicans seemed to find impractical. A member of the well-scrubbed generation of amateur politicians (his favorite descriptive phrase for himself is "clean-cut") who received their first taste of battle in the Eisenhower campaign, he is an attractive candidate to the independent voters who elected the Clark-Dilworth ticket in 1951. "The boy," Joe Clark concedes, "has got political sex appeal."

Nevertheless, as Dilworth's supporters point out, the fact remains that if elected the boy will be surrounded by a slate that was selected entirely by the Organization. And how would patronage be distributed? "I don't know anything about those jobs," Longstreth told me. "I'd naturally rely on the advice of the Republican ward leaders."

All in all the election should be a shoo-in for the Democratic candidates. Some Democratic leaders, notably John B. Kelley, father of the talented Grace and one of Dilworth's campaign managers, believe that this is in fact the case and predict large majorities for their entire ticket. This view is shared neither by my friend the Old Politician nor by Mayor Clark. They talk of the normal Republican impulse in Philadelphia and of the tendency of municipal reform movements in this country to burn themselves out after a term or two, but one senses that at the bottom of their fears is the suspicion that Richardson Dilworth, who has been long on the

hustings and conciliatory towards the Green organization, has become a slightly tarnished crusader in the imaginations of many voters.

Trade union leaders, who wanted Clark to run for reelection, felt that they were given a bad shuffle when the party slate was drawn up. There was considerable talk during the summer that labor's political action branches might remain neutral in the general election or even support Longstreth. Joe Clark himself admitted that Dilworth had permitted the Green organization to eclipse labor in the management of the Democratic coalition. As the campaign has progressed, however, there has been a general closing of ranks, and in the evening of September 29 the CIO-PAC, after a lengthy interrogation of both candidates, endorsed the entire Democratic ticket. The AFL is expected soon to follow suit.

Dilworth, recognizing the suspicion with which labor and the independents had begun to regard him, has taken great pains to identify himself personally with Clark—"As Joe Clark told me this morning. . . ."—but there is little evidence that the old relationship of unbounded confidence has been resumed. "They used to be like Damon and Pythias," a Democratic committeeman told me, "but they're not that way any more."


"I don't think the Republicans quite realize it themselves," the Old Politician told me, sitting on the porch of his Chestnut Hill home a few nights after our meeting in McShea's, "but they have at least an outside chance to win this election."

"The thing today is not the Organization—the city machines are done for. What counts now is the sincere candidate. Television has made the greatest change in American politics since the secret ballot. People today aren't hungry, but they are mixed up and confused. What they want is to see an honest face on the television screen."

THE outcome of the present contest, the Old Politician believes, will depend chiefly on the strategy of the Republican campaign during the week or so before election day. Mort Witkin, who agrees—"this is one of the first elections that I have ever approached feeling that the campaign made the slightest difference"—thinks that Longstreth should direct an all-out attack at the record of the Clark administration. Longstreth and Pomeroy, fearing Clark's popularity, are not so sure. "Frankly," Longstreth says, "I would not want to run against Joe Clark."

The Old Politician supports this latter view. "If the Republicans try to pick flaws in the record of the present administration they'll never get off the ground," he declared, splashing a shot of rye over the ice cubes in the glass that he held in one hand. "But if they can hang Dicky Dilworth as the man who sold out Joe Clark to the Democratic machine . . . Well, then we'll have the toughest fight on our hands that you ever saw."

"One way or the other," he said, raising his glass, "it will be one sweet election."



The Prospect for Disarmament

To avert mutual annihilation, Mr. Stassen invites the Russians to accept inspection as the first step. But what lies on the other side of his "gateway"?

THE WORLD has reached 11 A.A.—eleventh year of the Atomic Age—and the sense of urgency for achieving disarmament, or some form of arms regulation, was never lower. Every newsmagazine has carried its version of the saturation H-bomb attack and retaliation: how less than 100 missiles delivered checker-board fashion on the US or the USSR could end all economic life in one brisk night's work, and the cumulative blast, radiation and wind-borne ash could kill more persons than did all the wars since Christ.

Yet, public indifference is so profound that newspaper editors, with few exceptions, didn't bother to raise an eyebrow at the revelations which came out of Harold Stassen's UN negotiations last month—to wit, that the US will not at this time consider any plan to give up its stockpile of bombs, that the US will talk to the Russians only about an alarm system, that our government is so divided within itself over arms limitation that it is unable to put forward a plan of arms control.

Stassen was placed in charge of disarmament at the White House in the spring of 1955 and gathered around him a staff of exceedingly able technicians. It was they who drew up the comprehensive alarm system which Mr. Stassen laid before the UN disarmament talks in September of this year. These talks have led to a temporary deadlock, as we must conclude from a careful reading of the letters exchanged by President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin. Before the deadlock becomes rigid, it is time for the government to lift the secrecy on the arms discussion and make possible an informed debate.

But even without full government disclosure, it is possible to state the three broad alternatives which confronted Mr. Stassen and his staff. One is continuation of the arms race, limited only by each nation's resources. Another is a scheme of arms regulation to stabilize the security forces and discourage surprise attack. The third is total enforced disarmament, making it impossible for any nation to fight a major war. Among these approaches, the world must make its choice.

Look first at the arms race. It was Winston Churchill, in his last great speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, who popularized the idea that "the balance of terror" is a form of security, and a deterrent to war.

Among American leaders this notion was best expressed by Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles:

We believe that so long as we retain the capability to react to aggression with crushing force—regardless of how the aggressor could initiate war—we still have a convincing deterrent to war. . . . Such capability does exist in the free world. We intend that it shall exist in every foreseeable tomorrow, in fact, until some other reliable basis for peace has been achieved.

These remarks are far from comforting, for many things could go wrong with this balance. Consider these possibilities:

Atomic blackmail. The Soviet Union could hand over a few H-bombs and intercontinental bombers to Red China to be used for blackmail purposes. China, let us suppose, then offers to back up Communist North Viet-Nam in taking over Free South Viet-Nam, on the grounds that the South has violated the Geneva Truce of July, 1954. China threatens to use the H-bomb on any Western power that intervenes, but the US refuses to be intimidated. How do we avoid nuclear war?

Anonymous warfare. Suppose atomic weapons are supplied to a country like Egypt under the present Communist arms negotiations. These weapons are spirited away by Egyptian terrorists, smuggled into Israel, and there, in a series of mysterious explosions, vaporize Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, killing American tourists and destroying priceless Christian shrines. The source of the crime is obscure, but Egypt is suspected. Would we threaten retaliation? Would we supply Israel with atomic weapons for self-defense?

Atomic lunatics. Even Churchill, in his defense of terror last March, made this admission: "The deterrent does not cover lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout. That is a blank." One can visualize the vindictiveness of a South American dictator who recently spent ten days marooned on a gunboat in the River Plate without access, fortunately, to nuclear bombs.

Atomic bootleggers. As atomic fuel for civil use becomes common in small countries, and the knowledge of bomb making (already fairly simple and cheap) becomes more widely known, an unscrupulous and hard-pressed group like the Communist Party of Guatemala might engage in the clandestine production of weapons. Having produced a cache, it blows up the national capital and seizes power. When a counter-revolution appears in a neighboring country, that country is bombed too, killing the entire American Embassy staff. Do we reply with nuclear weapons?

The longer the balance of terror continues, the greater the risk of these peripheral developments, unless some form of arms inspection and regulation is achieved. Clearly Churchill and Secretary Quarles visualized a world in which only the US, Britain and the Russians possess the bomb, and they impute to these caretakers a pragmatic sense of self-preservation. But the problem will not long remain in such convenient focus.

THIS brings us to the second broad alternative—an agreement to regulate arms. Harold Stassen and his staff have accepted this as their immediate goal, and are proceeding under the following general principles:

1. We cannot consider giving up our stockpile of bombs because no inspection system is able to detect nuclear weapons which are hidden by an adversary. This conclusion is confirmed by leading scientists.

2. But we can inspect the means of launching an attack. If the Russians will agree to the stationing of thousands of Americans in Russia, and we will accept thousands of Russians in the US, here are some of the things these inspectors can do: fly reconnaissance flights, operate photographic-interpretation laboratories, watch airfields, rail centers and ports, check national expenditures on arms, and analyze the output of key industries—such as steel and electricity—to see where these basic ingredients of a war machine go. If a build-up for attack is spotted, the inspectors alert their home government. (This proposal is loaded in our favor because most of the intelligence obtainable by these methods is already available to the Russians and we therefore have much more reason than they do to fear surprise attack.)

3. If the Russians buy the alarm system stated in paragraph 2, we say we are then ready to move forward to arms limitations, but our National Security Council has not reached agreement on what limitation to recom-

mend. Staff studies have been made on schemes to reduce conventional armies, to prohibit further testing of nuclear weapons, and to prohibit the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. We might even negotiate an end of our overseas air bases before they are made obsolete by guided missiles.

4. Since the Russians "quibbled to death" every arms proposal during 1946-

1954, arguing mostly about the last stages of a plan rather than the first, Harold Stassen proposed to negotiate only about the first stage—the alarm system—which he calls the gateway to arms control. No one can see what lies beyond the gateway, but we Americans still insist that the alarm system, which favors us, is all that we will now discuss.

During the September talks in the UN the Russians refused to buy Harold Stassen's "pig in a poke." Premier Bulganin raised the basic question in his letter to President Eisenhower immediately before the President's illness: Where do you Americans stand on arms reduction? And the President has given no answer.

If the US is now to break the deadlock, several steps appear to be necessary:

First, our government should present to the American people and the free world a clear explanation of why we are no longer prepared to give up our bombs. This explanation should be accompanied by a statement of the limited circumstances under which we would judge it morally right to use the bomb. Unless this public statement is issued, it is we, not the Russians, who appear to be jeopardizing the rest of the world.

Second, our government must clarify our stand on what arms limitation lies beyond Stassen's "gateway," and state our position to the world in broad principle.

Third, our government must tell us the extent to which our national privacy will be invaded by thousands of alien inspectors, operating in our armed forces, transport systems, and industry. Silence on these problems could lead to isolationist repudiation such as Woodrow Wilson suffered in 1919.

Fourth, the US should reaffirm its adherence to disarmament—total, enforced disarmament—as the ultimate solution to war. This has been US policy since the 1930's and is favored by at least two-thirds of the world.

The third of the broad alternatives confronting Harold Stassen and his staff, total disarmament,



is assumed by them to be impossible during the Cold War.

But there is in the US a responsible body of persons who believe that total disarmament is not only possible, but is the only feasible way of preventing nuclear war. This view is held by the United World Federalists, and by such prominent public figures as Thomas Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force.

Those who advocate disarmament generally start with the same major propositions that Mr. Stassen employs: that is that inspection is indispensable, that inspectors cannot find hidden bombs, that a retaliatory bombing fleet therefore is necessary. But they believe that the inspectors and the bombing fleet should be in the hands of an international authority, not of individual nations; and they believe that the shift of power to an international force can take place now.

Those who hold disarmament not feasible at present

raise many questions, of which the two most difficult to answer are these: *How can you put together an international police force and bombing fleet in the midst of the Cold War without transferring to its ranks and command group the same intrigue, animosity and deadlocks which now mark the relations between East and West? And, how can nations accept such a compromise of sovereignty, under a scheme which is much more nearly a world government than its advocates like to admit?*

But the advocates reply that we cannot solve the problem of disarmament unless a comprehensive proposal is at least submitted for world debate.

The *New Republic* accepts this challenge in placing before its readers the following proposal. The plan is no nostrum. It may serve to re-open public debate on policies which could determine whether any of us live out a normal span of life.



A Proposal for Total, Universal Disarmament

by Charles G. Bolte

THE US Government has evidently abandoned the idea of disarmament. It now advocates a scheme of inspection of existing military establishments, which says nothing about regulating or reducing those establishments. It cannot long hold to this position. It will be driven by foreign and domestic pressures to advance some sort of proposal for actual reduction of armaments and armed forces. The question is, what will that proposal be?

I argue here for a drastic answer, which would strike at the roots of war. It is an answer which will be called Utopian. One virtue of a Utopian plan is that it can be used as a benchmark against which to test other proposals. What I propose is what I regard as the minimum compatible with our safety. If safety can be found in measures less far-reaching, I will of course be delighted.

The politics, psychology and economics of disarmament are not touched on here. The reader is asked to suspend his disbelief on all these grounds, for the duration of the article only.

The principles which must govern an effective disarmament scheme have been set forth by the Presidents and the Secretaries of State of the last two Administrations; they have been endorsed by resolutions of the US Senate; they stand as national policy, a foundation on which to build a real plan of disarmament.

To be effective and safe, disarmament must have three characteristics. It must be total, universal and enforceable.

Total Disarmament: The plan must include all kinds of weapons and all kinds of armed forces.

If the political will can be established to achieve disarmament at all, it will be found easier to arrive at agreement on complete than on partial disarmament. Past efforts to reach agreement on disarmament demonstrate this point. The history of the League of Nations is full of fruitless and tedious wrangles on qualitative disarmament, in which many efforts were made to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, without result. There is not much promise of real disarmament in the figures agreed upon last spring in the UN Disarmament Commission's subcommittee: 3 million Americans, British and French would be facing 3 million Russians and Chinese. Total disarmament is the only way to reach the point stated by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen in the Disarmament Commission in 1952 as the first US principle: "To prevent war . . . by making war inherently . . . impossible."

As long as nations must plan for war, they can hardly, if they are provident, agree on partial disarmament; for each will say that it needs more for its security than the others are willing to grant it; and what they will describe as "defensive" will unfailingly look "offensive" to their neighbors. A disarmament conference which aims only at reduction or control will wind up still quarreling over quotas and the proclaimed needs and international responsibilities of the various states.



CHARLES G. BOLTE worked on the development and presentation of the US position on disarmament as a member of the US delegation to the Paris General Assembly in 1951, and subsequently participated in the 1952 meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as an advisor to the US Representative, Benjamin V. Cohen. For the past year and a half he has been working on a book on disarmament, to be published early next year by Beacon Press.

Universal Disarmament: Such a plan must obviously be universal. As President Truman said: "No plan of disarmament can work unless it includes every nation having substantial armed forces. One-sided disarmament is a sure invitation to aggression."

Enforceable Disarmament: It will obviously not be safe for any major power to disarm simply on the basis of an exchange of promises with its potential enemies. To quote President Truman again: "Disarmament must be policed continuously and thoroughly." US officials and UN resolutions have always talked of "safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions, including inspection." The other safeguards have not been spelled out, and have now apparently been dropped by our government, which talks only of inspection. The only way the nations can be *sure* that their neighbors are observing the disarmament plan is through a technique of international control which provides full and fast information on developments everywhere in the world. The only way they can be *safe* in disarming is for the system to provide full and fast means of *policing* the agreement. Since the nations will no longer themselves have the power to wage war on their neighbors, this police power will have to be put into the hands of the UN, in the form of an international force adequate to cope with violations of the plan.

THESE three characteristics could be embodied in a number of different plans. Many variables are involved. Their determination will depend on military, scientific and political considerations at the time when agreement is reached.

The following is therefore not by any means a blueprint. It is an imaginary scale-model, based on some knowledge and some guesses, designed to show what a disarmament system might look like. It is advanced as a series of hypotheses to be discussed.

I. The maximum forces of each nation

These will have to be stated precisely. There will need to be a detailed statement of the kinds of weapons

permitted to these forces, and the permitted level of their annual expenditure.

For the plan to be effective, the criterion for determining the level of these armed forces and armaments will have to be a simple but drastic one: the amount of forces needed to preserve *internal* security. The talk about reducing armaments to the levels required for "national security" show that this concept is still very far from being accepted. But the plain fact is that there can be no effective disarmament if each nation reserves the right to maintain forces adequate for its "national security" in terms of the present political-strategic situation. The safe way to provide for the national security in the conditions now prevailing is to make security collective: to provide for each nation's security under the protective umbrella of a universal United Nations force, which can operate successfully in providing security for all only if it is more powerful than the forces of any one nation or likely combination of nations.

The forces of each nation would then not be armies, navies and air forces in the sense that we now know them. They would be more in the nature of national police. The force-limits might be sought to be arrived at by a negotiation which took into account a great many complex factors: and which would subsequently collapse into futility. It would be simpler to take the rough test of population. A desirable figure to be negotiated toward might be one policeman for every 500 inhabitants, with a limit of say 500,000 police.

However, numbers are not the chief concern. Weapons are.

II. The elimination of heavy weapons

Since the permitted national forces will have as their only task the preservation of internal order, they will not need any heavy weapons. Even in a totalitarian state, the national police should be able to do their job with small arms—rifles, carbines, pistols, and perhaps tear-gas, submachine guns, and armored cars for use in quelling riots.

With rigorous control of weapons, it becomes possible to allow for substantial variations in the number of permitted national forces. One country might have more organized forces than its neighbor; if it does not have the heavy weapons with which these forces could overrun and subjugate it, there would be little cause for alarm, especially if a heavily-armed UN force were available to repel any attack.


The UN should be given the power to control the production and allocation of all weapons.

Military aircraft would be denied to the nations. The danger would still exist that civil aircraft could be converted into long-range bombers. Effective international control of civil aircraft would therefore be needed.

III. Elimination of all weapons of mass destruction

The UN plan for control of atomic energy is at hand, ready to be elaborated in operational detail and put into effect. But atomic stockpiles are now so large, and so easily hidden, that the method of delivery is more important than atomic production. By prohibiting national air forces, you prevent a massive attack. The preparation of bombs and carriers in sufficient numbers to strike a knockout blow could be readily detected by the international inspectors in a disarmed world. Someone might still smuggle a bomb into a capital, and set it off: but there could be no massive attack by one nation upon another.

If weapons were controlled, there are sufficient stocks



USS Nautilus, atomic-powered submarine

of fissionable material now set aside for use in weapons to meet foreseeable peaceful needs for a long time. The UN Atomic Energy Commission plan itself, in a little-noted section, provides that large-scale production of atomic fuels would take place only when it was considered economically feasible and desirable. This implies that, even if the present plan were adopted as it stood, new production of atomic materials would drop, and existing stockpiles would be used for further research and power development.

The elimination of all new production of fissionable materials for a stated period of years would simplify the inspection and control problem substantially, since large-scale production complexes and plants could easily be identified, and there would be no need for the AEC to run production plants.

The production of bacterial weapons would also be prohibited. The enforcement of this prohibition would probably prove impossible as far as production alone is concerned, since these agents can be produced in a small laboratory. However, the elimination of the other weapons and forces needed to wage war in the modern world would mean that these agents could not be effectively used, since there would be no possibility of following up the attack.

Guided missiles would of course be eliminated entirely from national arsenals; the earth-satellite project would

have to become what it obviously should be, an international undertaking.

IV. Steps in carrying out the plan

The disarmament agreement should include a precise time-table showing the steps by which it is to be put into effect.

This time-table will of necessity be somewhat arbitrary: technically, the period could be either short or long, and the number of steps few or many. It will be better to do it fast, and keep the steps few and simple. The danger in our present situation is so great, if we can get out of it at all we will do well to do it quickly. The revelation of all information in a short time, and the assurance that all states are in fact disarming quickly, will help establish confidence, and will diminish the chance that some state will violate the agreement during the tricky years when it is being put into effect.

What is here proposed, therefore, is a program covering four steps, to be taken in four years. The principle governing the time-table is that no state be weakened relative to the others at the end of each step; what the US statement of principles calls "balanced reduction."

Proportionate reduction of armed forces and armaments, balanced throughout the steps, is therefore needed. In general, the aim is a one-quarter reduction in each step. Air force reduction is slower: if the scheme breaks down while it is being put into effect, it will be safer to have relatively intact air forces in being, as the chief deterrent to aggression. For the same reason, stockpiles of atomic weapons are left in national possession until the last step, although production is stopped in the first.

First Year

- Disbandment of 25 percent of the armed forces.
- Cessation of new recruiting.
- Closing of training establishments.
- Cessation of new naval ship-building.
- Cessation of production of atomic fuel.

Second Year

- Further 25-percent reduction in Army and Navy personnel.

- Further reduction of 15 percent in Air Force personnel.
- Cessation of new weapons and ammunition manufacturing.

- Delivery to the UN force of one-third of all naval vessels by classes.

- Cessation of the production of new military aircraft.

Third Year

- Further 25-percent reduction of Army and Navy personnel, 15 percent of Air Force personnel.

- Delivery to UN force of the second one-third of naval vessels.

- Delivery to UN force of one-third of all military aircraft.

- Conversion to civil use, destruction or impounding by the United Nations of one-half of all military vehicles,

artillery, tanks and similar categories of equipment.

Fourth Year

Disbandment of last 25 percent of Army and Navy personnel, and last 45 percent of Air Force personnel.

Conversion to civil use, destruction or impounding by the UN of remaining one-third of naval vessels, remaining two-thirds of military aircraft, and remaining one-half of other military equipment.

Impounding by UN of all stocks of atomic fuel and conversion to peaceful uses, destruction of weapons-casings, and entrance into force of prohibition of atomic weapons and of UN plan for control of atomic energy.

V. Composition and powers of the international inspectorate

The disarming process described here would be put into effect under the surveillance of this group.

The inspectorate would consist of an internationally-recruited, uniformed civil service, drawn from among the military, production men and scientific and technical personnel. They would be recruited for long terms, and would be generously paid.

The exact number of inspectors needed for each nation would be determined in negotiation, as a result of the exchange of information among the nations about the number and location of its presently-existing production facilities and military installations.

These inspectors would have to have unquestioned and immediate right of access to any part of the national territory and to any buildings or installations in it.

VI. Powers and duties of the control organ

The control organ and the police force present the thorniest problems. The possible variations are enormous in range. The objective to be sought is a system at once effective and tyranny-proof. The dangers are great of falling into something either ineffective or tyrannical.

The plan should embrace these elements:

1. *An international control agency;*
2. *An international inspection force, directed by the control organ;*
3. *An international police force, also directed by the control organ, whose duty would be to enforce the disarmament agreement;*
4. *A system of world courts, to issue injunctions against violations of the agreement, and to try individual violators under an established criminal code;*
5. *Provision for revenue.*


The direction of the inspectorate, and the power of acting on its advices, would be placed in the hands of the control organ. This control organ should be so established that its functioning is one of administering clearly-

defined powers and principles, not one of taking new political decisions as new cases come before it.

Since the agreement of the great powers is in any case essential to the success of any plan, the control organ's members should be appointed by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council (the five permanent members concurring).

In its day-to-day operations, it could not be subject to interference by either of these bodies. The commissioners might number five. They would serve for five years in staggered sequence, subject to removal on showing of cause. They would be selected as individuals, not national representatives, although of course no two of them should be from the same nation. None of them should be nationals of the great powers.

Since the control organ is to function administratively



The firing of history's first atomic artillery shell

and not politically, its powers and duties will have to be spelled out in the greatest detail in the agreement establishing the disarmament system. What this means is essentially that the paper setting forth the plan must state in precise terms the agreement among the nations on the permitted national forces and armaments, the steps to be taken in reaching the condition of disarmament, the composition and powers of the inspectorate, and all other details as to time, number, finances, control.

If there is violation, the control organ will have to move fast. The nations will not—or should not—join a disarmament plan unless they can be convinced that a violation by their neighbors will not result simply in long procedural wrangles and no action. The only way to avoid this is to draft a blueprint and give it to a group of men who are at the same time given explicit instructions for putting it into effect. With such a plan, and with a voice in the selection of the commissioners, we might ourselves be willing to accept such a system even if the Communist states comprised a majority of the United Nations: a test to which we might subject any plan in an effort to forecast whether it could conceivably be accepted by the Russians.

VII. The UN police force

Only such a force will make it safe for states to disarm. If they are to strip themselves of the means of

defending themselves, they will—or should—insist upon the protection of a UN force, which can deal promptly and effectively with any violation of the agreement.

Since the UN force will have a monopoly of heavy weapons (collected to begin with from the stocks surrendered by the nations), it will not have to outnumber the national police force of any nation or likely combination of nations. In a truly disarmed world, a UN force of 300,000 should be sufficient to cope with any violations or evasions of the disarmament scheme, or with any likely breaches of the peace.

The force would be air-borne, and would be based on airfields strategically placed in the various continents and especially on islands along their coasts. The troop-carrying aircraft and logistics carriers would be supported by long-range fighters, and by short-range fighter-bombers for base defense. There would be a complement of heavy bombers for the destruction of a dangerous factory or atomic-energy installation which might be seized.

Members of the force would be recruited as volunteers, predominantly from the smaller states, and with a fixed limit on the number from any nation. Units would be of mixed nationality; members would not serve in their continents of origin. Commanders would be rotated regularly, and units periodically reshuffled, so as to avoid the danger which might flow from a Praetorian Guard kind of loyalty. There would be a system of regional commands, self-contained: not only for military efficiency, but so that a rebellious command could be quelled by its neighbor, in case of need.

The role of this force would be simple in concept, like that of the inspectorate: to prevent violation or evasion of the disarmament agreement, and to prevent or repel attacks across national borders.

The command of this force would be vested in the UN control organ. If the inspectors reported a violation, the control organ would report immediately to the Security Council. It would possess the normal police power of apprehending violators *in delicto*—an attack on a UN base or across a frontier, for example. In less immediately threatening circumstances, the legal officers would go to one of the special courts established under the International Court of Justice by the disarmament treaty to ask for a preliminary injunction. This granted, the control organ would call on the offending government or group to comply; if defied, it would direct into action whatever UN forces were required to deal with the violation.

Their function would include the arrest of the violators—including the chief of state if the plot appeared to be directed by the government—and their return to the world court or a subsidiary court for trial.

The police force, with its equipment, might cost as much as \$5 billion a year; the inspectorate another \$500 million. Costs could be met by levying some form of

UN tax—perhaps export and import duties, or an excise tax which would fall equally but gently on as many individuals as possible, so that each would feel in some sense a participant in the maintenance of peace.

VIII. Co-ordinating the schedules

The build-up of the UN force should proceed concurrently with the disarming process. As the power of the individual nations to defend themselves grows smaller, the power of the international force to protect them all should grow greater. The schedule for establishing the UN force should therefore be related to the four-step schedule suggested for disarmament.

First Year

Appointment by disarmament commissioners of general staff and regional commanders.

Negotiations with governments for purchase or long-term lease of UN bases (general location prescribed in the agreement).

Development of staff plans for employment of forces.

Establishment of recruiting techniques.

Second Year

Commencement of recruiting—first one-third of personnel sworn in and begins training.

Commanders and staffs, under direction of commissioners, prepare detailed plans for use of forces in various contingencies.

Impounding, for use, for moth-balling, or for scrap, of first third of national naval vessels.

Third Year

Second one-third of personnel recruited.

Force receives from national governments first transfers of air and ground weapons and equipment, for use, for moth-balling, for conversion, or for scrap.

Fourth Year

Last one-third of personnel recruited.

Force receives remainder of weapons and equipment from governments.

IT MAY be said that we cannot get a foolproof plan for disarmament, that we must settle for something less than maximum security. This seems to have been the unstated assumption behind the development of the Western position in the two years before the recent Big Four meeting in Geneva, when the concept of enforcement was whittled away to mean merely the setting up of an inspection system.

It may be that inspection is all we can get, given the present political situations of the US and the USSR. But we cannot know this, because *a detailed plan for enforced disarmament has not yet been spelled out and submitted for consideration to either the Soviet Government or the American people*. The odds are that both would reject anything so drastic as the foregoing. But in our present situation, can we afford to pass up even the long shots?

BOOKS & COMMENT

Adoration of a Ghostly Past

by Allen E. Tuttle

LAFKADIO HEARN, more than any other writer has been credited with—and blamed for—the romantic stereotypes of Japan existing in the American mind for the last half century. His unfamiliar Japan seems now to be a series of all too familiar idyls from Elfland: Mount Fuji through the cherry blossoms; ghostly temples bathed in moonlight; sails of fishing junks melting into the river mist; *bon odori* danced in the light

RE-ASSESSMENT: 1955

of a harvest moon; villagers scuffling across a great wooden bridge; little ladies posed demurely, fan in hand, like figures on a teacup; miniature peasants, with Wordsworthian attachment to their soil, beating out a harvest with antique threshing tools; and bronzed pygmies in loin cloths tugging on nets filled with fish.

At the turn of the century, literary globetrotters who had provided themselves with *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan* before touring through the Province of the Gods and from Hoki to Oki saw all this and more. Also they must have been amused by the contrarities of what Loti called "this singular fatherland of all preposterousness," and impressed by the degree of Westernization in the port cities; but Hearn devoted little attention to ridiculous details in topsy-turvy land and looked upon the port cities with mingled wonder and loathing. His heart was in the beauty of Old Japan. He was not satisfied merely to report the charming things he saw and heard. He wanted to understand them and make his readers in the West understand them. As time went by he grew more and more absorbed in the spirit behind the fascinating externals.

His *Glimpses* in 1894 was only the beginning of a prolific literary activity against a Japanese backdrop. *Out of the East*, published in the following year, revealed a lessening of his early excite-

ment of discovery and an increased absorption in Buddhism. Also with this volume he established a loose pattern for almost all of his books to come. Seldom at ease in a large, integrated piece of writing, he turned his talents to episode and essay, collecting in a single volume bits of legend and lore, reveries, renditions of old poetry and proverbs, the remains of immemorial customs, and observations on the contemporary scene. Much of this material was colored by his own brand of Buddhism and Spencerism. His style, though sometimes heightened by an eerie suggestiveness of word and phrase, was pruned of the lushness and extravagance characteristic of much of his New Orleans work—"the Period of Gush," as he once put it.

His published volumes followed an almost annual succession: *Kokoro*, "hints and echoes of Japanese inner life"; *Gleanings in Buddha-Fields*; *Exotics and Retrospectives*, with its poetic essays on inherited memory; *In Ghostly Japan*, containing one of Hearn's favorite pieces, a diminutive tale called "Fragment," which he had laboriously reworked from a story Ernest Fenollosa had told him. In the next four volumes—*Shadowings*, *A Japanese Miscellany*, *Kotto*, and *Kwaidan*—there was a liberal offering of stories, many of them weird and ghostly. A gothic strain had appeared back in Hearn's Cincinnati days, when he had written journalistic accounts of grisly murders and slaughterhouse procedures. This strain never entirely disappeared; in the last decade of his life it emerged saturated with Japanese antiquity.

Japan, an Attempt at Interpretation, published in the year of his death, 1904, is his final and most ambitious attempt to understand his adopted land. The very title testifies to the diffidence of one with an alien heritage and little formal training to undertake such a task:

No work fully interpreting that life—
no work picturing Japan within and

without, historically and socially, psychologically and ethically—can be written for at least another fifty years.

But his *Japan* is an impressive work. Americans had not been treated to such a stimulating appraisal of things Japanese, since Percival Lowell's *The Soul of the Far East* in 1888.

It was Lowell's book that had been largely responsible for arousing in Hearn the enthusiasm which sent him to Japan in 1890; and in 1902, as he set about formulating his final interpretation of Japan, Lowell's book was in his mind. He wanted to do something like it, he said, "but from a different point of view," and with "a totally different view of the causes and the evolution of things." Lowell interpreted the soul of the Far East as impersonality, and defended his thesis with examples from many areas of Japanese life—customs, language, art, religion. Impersonality posed the threat of extinction; to an evolutionist it was an indication that the race had ceased to evolve. Lowell maintained that the degree of individualization in a people is an index to their mental development. Those races rich in this psychic differentiation survive; those races lacking it must inevitably give way to dynamic ones. When Hearn got to Japan and reflected on this prophecy, it was to worry him to the end of his life, and it hangs ominously over his final attempt at interpretation.

THE Japan to which Hearn came in 1890 was a hybrid containing disparate elements of the old and the new, often in ludicrous combinations as in the costumes of its Westernized statesmen. The port cities were offering abundant evidence of Japanese vitality under the new stimulus of the West. In the back country, however, far to the western side of the empire, some pulses of the expiring Old Japan could still be discerned, and it was there in Izumo, the "Province of the Gods," that Hearn made his home.

It was there, sheltered from the competition, industrial ugliness, and congenial respectabilities that he caught his first glimpse of the moral beauty of Old Japan. "The more one sees of it, the more one marvels at its extraordinary goodness, its miraculous patience, its never-failing courtesy, its simplicity of heart, its intuitive charity," he wrote. And again:

Well, I have been fourteen months in

Izumo; and I have not heard voices raised in anger, or witnessed a quarrel: never have I seen one man strike another, or a woman bullied, or a child slapped. Indeed I have never seen any real roughness anywhere that I have been in Japan, except at the open ports, where the poorer classes seem, through contact with Europeans, to lose their natural politeness, their native morals, —even their capacity for simple happiness.

How could one withstand the charms of a civilization characterized by tact, good nature, happy looks, pleasant words, courtesy, kindness to animals, and the daily hot bath? Here pleasure was found, not in egoistic assertion, but in obedience to the social order. The crown of this moral order was woman. With Western gallantry he pays her a final tribute in *Japan*: "Before this ethical creature, criticism should hold its breath; for there is here no single fault save the fault of a moral charm unsuited to any world of selfishness and struggle." Through disillusionment and discouragement Hearn was to keep his romantic conception of Old Japan, reaffirming his earlier convictions in his last interpretation.

To describe Old Japan he needed only his acute, perceptive and emotional powers; to explain it he turned to what he once called the "Oceanic Majesty and Power and Greatness and Holiness and Omniscience of the mind of Herbert Spencer." The reader returning today to Hearn's *Japan* returns perforce to the Synthetic Philosophy. Much of the quaintness readers feel in Hearn is the quaintness of Spencer. Hearn's *Japan* reads like a long illustrative appendix—though a very readable one—to a gigantic edition of Spencer.

BELIEVING that religion is an ethical reflection of a race experience and a record of social evolution, Hearn examines first the origin and growth of Shinto, a cult embracing the worship of family, clan, and imperial ancestors, which constitutes "remarkable evidence of Spencer's exposition of the law of religious development." Following Spencer's *Sociology*, he explains that religion developed from the simple belief that man possessed a "double," which needed after his death to be propitiated and which possessed power over the living. Worship developed out of funeral rites. Ghosts and gods at first were scarcely distinguishable, gods being only espe-

cially powerful and apotheosized ghosts. Such a faith, Hearn says, having its dim beginnings in fear and its early worship in the effort to escape the anger of ghosts, developed into "a religion of affection." To Shinto he attributes the basic virtues of Japan.

Yet Shinto cannot account for the whole Japanese spirit. Buddhism he regards as a complementary influence on the race. The introduction of Buddhism to Japan in the sixth century was, he says, a humanizing factor, which softened some of the severities of Shinto and transplanted Chinese arts and industries. Through the years he had been explaining to his readers how Buddhism and Spencerian evolution could be reconciled: "It was because of my acquaintance with the Synthetic Philosophy that I came to find in Buddhist philosophy a more than romantic interest," he explains.

HEARN does not forget Lowell's diagnosis of the soul of Japan, and in the concluding pages of *Japan* his fear comes out:

... An evil dream comes oftentimes to those who love Japan: the fear that all her efforts are being directed, with desperate heroism, only to prepare the land for the sojourn of peoples older by centuries in commercial experience; that her thousands of miles of railroads and telegraphs, her mines and forges, her arsenals and factories, her docks and fleets, are being put in order for the use of foreign capital; that her admirable army and her heroic navy may be doomed to make their last sacrifices in hopeless contest against some combination of greedy states. . . .

Though he writes bravura passages about the durable core of ancient virtues, he cannot hide his concern for that superb moral system which has been the object of his praise and fear for over a decade.

As a student of Spencerian ethics, Hearn knew that Japan in its isolation had achieved a social adjustment in which relationships, manners, customs, and ways of thinking had become stable; also it had achieved an almost perfectly tuned, virtually hereditary ethical system. But Hearn had learned from Spencer that ethics during a period of adjustment could be only relative and imperfect. Hearn knew too the hope of Spencerian ethics: that after thousands of years of struggle and pain in readjustment another equilibrium would be es-

tablished. This knowledge infuses the concluding pages of *Japan*, but as with *Rasselas*, the consolations of philosophy could afford little comfort to one who was faced with loss.

THOUGH he accepted evolution intellectually, he recoiled at the brutality, the ugliness, and the seeming immorality of it all. He found no prospect that pleased him long except Spencer's far-off golden realm. The romantic ideal of perfectibility was both his comfort and despair. Not only were the contours of his Old Japan shaped by his idealism, but, to compound the confusion, misinterpreted by some of his readers as the whole of Japan. In the latter parts of his interpretation, however, he attempts to look realistically at New Japan. He admits that the nation must become industrialized, though he is reluctant to admit that he would hate industrialized Japan. Discussing the economic misery of the urban poor in present transition, he feels impelled, as did Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris, to recall an earlier and happier time, when the responsibilities and attachments of masters and servants prevented unemployment and other economic hardships.

Hearn's *Japan* can best be read with the awareness that Hearn, in spite of such labels as folk-lorist, decadent, impressionist, and the like, was a Victorian, with some of the same problems of the so-called "solid" Victorians on the other side of the world. They too were troubled by the impact of industrialism and science on spiritual values rooted in a venerable culture, and if their soul-struggle shaded disappointingly into appeasement, exhaustion, and an uneasy armistice, so did Hearn's. How can the soul of Old Japan survive the transformations of national life by science and industrialism? The concluding pages of *Japan* raise the question; the answer is a disappointing compromise, and one which suggests failure: "The future Japan must rely upon the least amiable qualities of her character for success in the universal struggle. . . ."

As Hearn writes the last pages, Japan is gambling her future in a war with Russia. She seems beset, if not overwhelmed, by crises. Today's reader may prefer to turn from Hearn's perplexities and ambitious rationalizations to the poetic, ghostly Japan which he creates, or half creates, from the stuff that dreams are made of.

Can Faith and Reason be Reconciled?

by Will Herberg

THE RELATION between faith and reason has long perplexed philosopher and theologian alike. With the revival of biblical theology in recent years, and the turn taken by philosophy in the past half century, the issue has become particularly acute. The newer theology takes its stand once again within the biblical revelation as the governing context of all knowledge of ultimate reality, while contemporary philosophy, insofar

Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, by Paul Tillich (Chicago; \$2.25).

as it speaks of ultimate reality at all, insists on the autonomy and all-sufficiency of reason, experience, or both. No wonder that attempts at mediating between the two, let alone reconciling them, seem to be vain and misdirected endeavors to many present-day theologians and philosophers.

Paul Tillich is not one of these. Despite its brevity, his latest book is a comprehensive apology—or at least the outline of a comprehensive apology—for the kind of theology Tillich represents, one that claims to be both genuinely philosophical and genuinely biblical.

Tillich does not permit himself the easy way of reducing in advance the opposition between philosophy and biblical religion by blunting the challenge of either. He presents both in their full authenticity, and thus reveals the deep inner tension between them. Biblical religion is intensely personalistic—"According to every word of the Bible, God reveals himself as personal, [and] the encounter with him, and the words describing this encounter, are thoroughly personal"—but the philosophical enterprise is directed toward the "a-personal concept of being."

Biblical faith is anchored in the doctrine of creation, which "denies any substantial participation of man in God, [replacing] substantial identity by personal distance"; ontology, on the other hand, "speaks of being-itself as the ground of everything that is . . . of the one substance out of which all finite things are made." Biblical religion is historical through and through, taking a radically historical view of reality;

"how can this be united with the [philosophical] search for ultimate reality," in which the attempt is made to analyze the immutable structures of being? Biblical religion is social and ethical: God comes to man in the context of human society with a demand for decision and action; the ontological question is raised in isolation and solitude. In the biblical scheme, "the word for religious existence is faith . . . being grasped by the ultimate concern"; philosophy, according to Tillich, is characterized by "radical doubt and radical research," in which faith seems to have no part.

This series of antitheses might be extended, and the opposition sharpened; to all appearances, philosophy and theology face in entirely different directions and say entirely different things. Yet, it is Tillich's conviction that "despite the tremendous tension between [the two], they have an ultimate unity and profound interdependence."

TILlich shows first that every theologian, whether he wills it or not, necessarily philosophizes, since every human being philosophizes once he begins to think; turning one's back on philosophy merely leads to bad philosophy. He also shows that "faith includes the ontological question, whether the question is [explicitly] asked or not," for it includes the questions of being and existence; indeed, the biblical emphasis on creation, history, and eschatology immediately raise ontological questions of depth and amplitude. On the other side, philosophy itself is not so far from the attitudes and orientation of faith. "Ontology presupposes a conversion, an opening of the eyes, a revelatory experience," as the entire tradition of philosophy, East and West, testifies. The ultimate concern of the ontological quest is being-itself, but is this not also the reality of the God to whom the Bible witnesses? "The God who is a being is transcended by the God who is Being-Itself, the ground and abyss of every being. The God who is a person is transcended by the God who is Personal-Itself, the ground and abyss of every person." Nor can the philosopher's doubt be contrasted unequivocally with

the belief of the man of faith. Ultimately, they are both in very much the same position. "*As the philosopher has not and has, the believer has and has not*: this is the basis on which ontology and biblical religion find each other."

It is an appealing reconciliation, but questions arise. Does not Tillich, in his theory and practice, tend to use terms like philosophy and ontology without due regard to the ambiguities they contain? Philosophy may mean a critical-analytical enterprise, or it may mean speculative system-building. Ontology may be rooted in the conception that sees being, even human being, as immutable essence or substance; or it may be rooted in a view that sees "the human person and man's society [as] by nature historical, [so that] the ultimate truth about life must be mediated historically," as Reinhold Niebuhr puts it. Granted that all thinkers, even the most biblical of theologians, pursue philosophy and ontology once they begin to think seriously; but is this a reason for speaking of philosophy and ontology as though it were a one-directional enterprise? Against Pascal, Tillich maintains: "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the same." To which we may ask: *which philosophers?*

Tillich is himself aware of the qualified character of the reconciliation he effects. The last words of this profound little book reflect his thinking at its best, and state the final outcome in a form with which this reviewer would heartily agree: "Faith comprises both itself and the doubt of itself . . . Biblical religion is the negation and the affirmation of ontology. To live serenely and courageously in these tensions, and to discover finally their ultimate unity in the depths of our own souls, and in the depth of the divine life, is the task and the dignity of human thought."

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History in the Round

by David Fellman

THE great Jeffersonian agrarian myth, so powerfully reinforced by Frederick Jackson Turner and the frontier romanticists, and still deeply entrenched in the American public mind, is critically dissected in this sophisticated and singularly brilliant book by one of our rising and most gifted historians. This is not a conventional history of the age of reform—which, running from

The Age of Reform, by Richard Hofstadter (Knopf; \$4.50).

about 1890 to the Second World War, embraces Populism, the Progressive movement, and the New Deal—but rather an analysis of ideas and general tendencies. It is intellectual history of a very high order. Completely devoid of such historical simplicisms as the class struggle and monistic interpretations of history, Hofstadter writes in the context of modern psychological and sociological insights, drawing attention to the significance of public moods, myths and nostalgia, psychic satisfactions, status problems, group pressures and administrative organization.

The American mind, as the author points out, was raised upon a sentimental attachment to rural living. "The agrarian myth," he writes, "represents a kind of homage that Americans have paid to the fancied innocence of their origins." And the more fictional the

myth became the more widely and tenaciously was it believed. But the agrarian myth was made obsolete by the triumph of commercial agriculture, which highlighted new ideals of opportunity, career and the self-made man. "What developed in America was an agricultural society whose real attachment was not to the land but to land values!" The typical farmer, under the impact of capitalistic and speculative agriculture, was not a yeoman or villager, but "a harassed little country businessman who worked very hard, moved all too often, gambled with his land, and made his way alone."

Correcting an important element of the Turner thesis, Hofstadter notes that the city became the safety-valve for the country, and ultimately furnished the great internal market upon which agricultural prosperity depends. He demonstrates that Populism was not a frontier phenomenon, but rather another episode in the old tradition of American entrepreneurial radicalism that dates from at least the Jackson period. Of course, the Progressive movement, which was centered in the urban middle classes, and led by city people, was hardly frontier-inspired. Furthermore, as the author points out, neither Populism nor Progressivism was concerned with social democracy or social equality, but rather with greater opportunities.

WHILE Populism which appealed to the old phases of the agrarian mythology—agriculture's "soft" side, Hofstadter calls it—failed as a political movement, commercial agriculture as an economic interest succeeded. Hofstadter underscores the point that American farmers were least powerful when most numerous, competitive and unorganized, and became stronger when relatively fewer in numbers, better-organized and self-centered in the pursuit of economic interests. This he calls agriculture's "hard" side.

One of the principal themes of this book is that there were substantial differences between Populism, Progressivism and the New Deal. Contrary to widespread belief, they were not lineally related, though of course each has left its mark. Thus, Progressivism, as compared

with Populism, was much less provincial, more concerned with urban problems, more informed, more moderate and complex, less rancorous, and more attractive to city people. The New Deal he regards as almost totally different. Progressivism is described as "the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization." The New Deal, however, was animated by a managerial impulse. It was more interested in engineering, administration and economics than in morals and uplift. It accepted a major positive role for the federal government, including a new fiscal role. It did not try to re-establish a competitive order. "It was, in short, a concerted effort to discipline the pricing policies of business. . . ." It was bold and experimental, and indifferent to the inhibitions of ancient mythology.

Finally, Hofstadter lays to rest the widespread notion that reform is necessarily a response to economic adversity. The New Deal was such a response, but Progressivism was not a product of economic hardship. It flourished in a period of general prosperity. The explanation is that the Progressives were the victims of an upheaval in status. He writes:

The newly rich, the grandiosely or corruptly rich, the masters of great corporations, were bypassing the men of the Mugwump type—the old gentry, the merchants of long standing, the small manufacturers, the established professional men, the civil leaders of an earlier era. . . . They were less important, and they knew it. . . . They no longer called the tune, no longer commanded their old deference. They were expropriated, not so much economically as morally.

We must perforce live with our past. That is why it is important for us to try to understand it. Hofstadter's book will help us to appreciate more fully an extremely important part of our intellectual and political heritage.

Notes on Contributors

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TELEVISION

ON A RECENT Sunday afternoon the television networks served up a glimpse of the future and of the past, and as examples of how bad and how good television can be, both were interesting.

First to light up my screen was an NBC "Special" called 1976. It was intended to show what life would be like on the two-hundredth anniversary of the American Revolution, and it was presented in connection with something called Oil Progress Week, of which I hadn't heard. Our journey into the future was made, for some reason, aboard a thoroughly traditional railway coach. Dave Garroway appeared as the conductor on this train, and at the 1976 stop he took charge of a Typical American Family, consisting of a beautiful blonde wife, a loud-mouthed husband, and a quiet little boy.

Mr. Garroway, who discarded his conductor's cap when he left the train, introduced the Typical American Family to the world of 1976. He showed them a mystifying diorama, spoke briefly of "vertical housing projects" 100 to 150 stories high, and then led his charges directly into a one-story-high, 1976-model home, which looked like a big, empty stage bounded by flimsy screens. There were a good many television gadgets around; more gadgets including a fireplace encased in a transparent cylinder, descended from the ceiling; and there was one uncomfortable looking chair, which creaked, I'm happy to report, when the loud-mouthed husband sat down in it to watch the ball game.

For the beautiful blond wife there was a wee kitchen, built around a self-propelled stool. (Earlier, Mr. Garroway had informed the awed couple that automobiles no longer entered cities in 1976 and that, despite the existence of moving sidewalks, people had "learned to walk again.") As it turned out, the blonde didn't need much kitchen space or much mobility. She could shop by television and serve packaged meals which would be cooked by heat waves, at the table, in thirty seconds.

This vision of mad delights was interrupted by a sudden flash-back to naval action in World War II, which served as an introduction to a talk by Fleet Ad-

miral Chester W. Nimitz. The Admiral spoke of his boyhood in Texas, which got him around to the subject of oil wells, which, in turn, led him to extoll the accomplishments of the American oil industry in the war years. Then Mr. Garroway interviewed a bright, young, crew-cut research chemist, who spoke glowingly of the progress resulting from the "terrific competition" in the oil business. Then the chemist went back to his laboratory, and Mr. Garroway went ahead to 1976.

By this time it was obvious—to me, at least, that nothing good was going to come of 1976. And nothing did. After some more foolishness about household gadgets, Wally Cox appeared as an automobile salesman, or, rather, as a seller of "automobile subscriptions." The car he was demonstrating was powered by a gas turbine, which, oddly enough, was just what that crew-cut chemist was working on back in 1955. This bit ended up with some talk about automation; automation, it seemed, had proved to be a great blessing to the human race, because it gave people freedom for creative pursuits.

Uneasiness was now evident at either end of the television cable. Sid Caesar and Nanette Fabray came on and did their act—you know the one—about the wife who smashes up the family car (for "car" read "helicopter") and has to break the news to her husband. There were gags about the rocket traffic jam over Hawaii, about nuclear fishcakes, about push-button housekeeping, and, finally, about a "fight-decider" machine.

All at once the emphasis of the show shifted completely. Mr. Caesar said something about keeping machines in their place, and Mr. Garroway told the Typical Family that, machines or no machines, people would still have to work for a full, happy life. At this moment it was discovered that the quiet little boy—a pretty bright kid—was finding life in 1976 lousy and Old Loud-Mouth began to deliver a pep-talk. Machines, he said, would give parents more time to spend with their kiddies; machines would free people from routine jobs and thereby provide more teachers (I didn't follow this one); machines would also provide more jobs for workers (I didn't get this one either); and in the age of automation the message of the clergy would still hold true.

The whole mess ended with Carl Sandburg reading from *The People*, Yes,

which made it official that NBC and the oil industry were pro-people. In these closing moments there was one bright note, one solid proof that automation has not yet conquered all. During a momentous pause in Mr. Sandburg's delivery, the voice of some nice, stupid, mixed-up human being came through loud and clear. "Quiet, please," it said.

On that note I escaped from 1976 and twisted the dial to see what *Omnibus* was up to on CBS. Thanks to the unfailing perversity of television scheduling, I had already missed the first half hour of the show, but a full hour remained, and I enjoyed every minute of it. *Omnibus* was looking backward to the Renaissance, to the world from which Columbus came. (This was the Sunday before Columbus Day.) Charlton Heston, looking rakish in a wig, plunging neckline, and tights, served in roughly the same capacity as that of Mr. Garroway in 1976, but he had no Typical American Family to weigh him down, and he spoke with wit and intelligence and enthusiasm of a great and gadget-free age.

With first-rate actors, effective sets, and ingenious lighting, *Omnibus* told of an intellectual revolution, of the kidnapping of scholars by princes competing for cultural supremacy, of the scavenging for classical texts, of the flowering of artistic genius, of the invention of printing and the ensuing spread of literacy, of research and innovation and discovery. It told, too, of magical rites and fantastic superstition, of riotous street carnivals and upper-class adulteries, of immorality and cruelty and ignorance. And it told of vitality and ferment and synthesis.

Like 1976, *Omnibus* made use of a flash-back—to the Middle Ages and the debate of churchmen over the corporeality of angels; and the rhetorical display turned out to be very impressive. The central figures of the *Omnibus* Renaissance were Lorenzo de' Medici and Savonarola, and these two, in an imaginary sequence, also debated, presenting their sharply conflicting philosophies. Lorenzo died in 1492, the year of Columbus' voyage, and with his death *Omnibus* brought down the curtain. It was splendid adult entertainment, and I was very sorry I had missed the beginning of it by hanging around in the bleak and idiotic world of 1976.

DAVID R. EBBITT

THEATRE

IN *Tiger at the Gates*, Hector fails—and this is the gist of the action—to keep the Trojans out of war. Giraudoux wrote the play to explain, as far as possible, why. At no point does Hector tell himself, as we tell ourselves whenever danger arises, that war is morally and materially necessary. The immediate causes of Giraudoux's Trojan war are as trivial and

Tiger at the Gates, by Jean Giraudoux,
tr. by Christopher Fry (Plymouth).

accidental as the murder of an archduke at Sarajevo. The underlying cause is larger but so mysterious that it can only be hinted at—in the cryptic word Destiny. It is not long since historians spoke scornfully of such "mystical" conceptions, but today there are signs that they are coming round. Let me quote one:

Our fight is against some devilry that lies in the very process of things, against something that we might even call demonic forces existing in the air.

Which is exactly what Giraudoux demonstrates in his play. If the fight between Hector and Destiny is an unequal one, we do not admire the Trojan the less because he cannot, and even knows he cannot, succeed. On the contrary, in a universe so malign, defiance is the supremely—perhaps the uniquely—admirable quality. Such, at any rate, is the view stated here by Giraudoux and restated later by Sartre, by Camus.

If decadence means that individual cells have developed at the expense of the organism a whole, the art of Giraudoux cannot escape the charge of decadence. In his plays; language descends in such a torrent that the speeches, as it were, jump the banks of the drama. In *Tiger*, for example, the logic and eloquence of one passage makes Andromache say that she and Hector live in constant conflict; the action of the play suggests quite the contrary. Giraudoux's peculiarities make him the harder to translate. What are we to say to this description of love making? "When they disentangled themselves they licked each other with the tips of their tongues because they found they were tasting salty"? The line was wisely cut in the

New York production of *Tiger*, but I hasten to add that Mr. Fry has commendably done much less cutting than is usual on these occasions. He modestly and correctly describes his script as a translation, not an adaptation. It speaks beautifully throughout. My only reservations have to do with a certain British upper-class gush that occasionally weakens the style. When Giraudoux had Helen say of men, "it's nice to rub them against you like great cakes of soap," Mr. Fry substitutes: "they're as pleasant as soap and a sponge and warm water." He translates the quite plain "vous le savez bien" with the modish "you know only too well," and in one place "belle" is rendered as "ravishing."

These are peripheral points. Central is the fact that the show provides one of the finest evenings of theatre that I have ever experienced in New York; and, though I have seen Giraudoux plays in several countries and on many occasions, this is the first time that I have been completely captivated. For one thing, *Tiger* is among his very best plays. Second, solutions were found to the problem of performing him which I preferred even to Louis Jouvet's (though I have not seen Jouvet's production of this particular play.) Accustomed to a type of drama in which dialogue is subordinated to character, the director, Harold Clurman, has made his actors fill in what the author left vague. Occasionally, perhaps, there is a little embarrassment, for Mr. Clurman has insisted that an actor maintain the character in passages where Giraudoux has forgotten everything except that actors are standing there reciting.

But, upon the whole, the Clurman production succeeds in adding a good deal of drama to the show without forfeiting one jot of dignity or eloquence. I enjoyed the Clurman production of *Colombe* two years ago, but could scarcely help being bothered by the varieties of style and non-style in the cast. The matter has been attended to this time. The solution was: English actors; and the few Americans who had to be added to please Equity have been what Hitler would call "co-ordinated" (except for an awkward Ajax). Half the play is Hector, and half the cast is Michael Redgrave who plays him. The time has come to stop under-rating this not merely intellectual but also intelligent man, this not merely agreeable but also heroic actor. Though, in *Tiger*, he underscores

the witticisms too heavily (English actors are always told to regard the American audience as slow-witted) the body and soul of the part are there, and one can scarcely think of another actor in English-speaking theatre who could have put them there. The rest of the cast couldn't be on this level: if Mr. Redgrave is rather more than a match for Jouvet, Walter Fitzgerald, though sound enough as Ulysses, is no match for the great actor for whom the part was written (Pierre Renoir.) On the other hand, I cannot imagine even a French production beating the beautiful Diane Cilento's witty comment on Helen or Leueen MacGrath's delicately pointed portrayal of Cassandra.

What is great theatre? The component parts are brains, good taste, fine craftsmanship, high purpose, and so forth and so on, but the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and imposes itself as a single impression which is at once emotional entrancement and intellectual satisfaction. Our theatre is a place where, normally, the silence is broken by nothing more coherent or congenial than the clatter of dishes in a sink, but once in a long while a great gong is heard, reminding us that reality and the art that represents it are no small matter. I think I have heard this solemn note a few times; of which the second night of *Tiger* was one.

Most of the play could have been written last week. Take this passage:

It's usual on the eve of every war for the two leaders of the peoples concerned to meet privately at some innocent village on a terrace in a garden overlooking a lake. And they decide together that war is the world's worst scourge. . . .

But this description of the Geneva Conference of 1955 was written before Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden in 1938. It has taken the play twenty years to cross the Atlantic, a fact which prompts a further reflection. The nineteen thirties was the decade of political art, and anti-war drama flourished: it was mainly Popular Front melodrama heralding the final victory. How strange, then, that the two best anti-war plays of the decade were pessimistic, and that neither of them reached the American stage until 1955! The other, Brecht's *Mother Courage*, has still not arrived.

ERIC BENTLEY

BANDWAGON

A FUN MAKING burlesque on Communism turned out to be no joking matter when a University of Tampa fraternity sought to stage a dance tonight as a "Kommunist Kaper."

Members of the Tau Kappa Epsilon fraternity said they were "shocked and surprised" to get the word at 11:30 P.M. that their red-ridiculing posters be taken down.

Signs which suggested students trip the light fantastic to the tune of the Bolshevik Five were removed after American Legion USS Tampa Post No. 5 inquired into the nature of the thing.

Dean of Men Boyd B. Burnside said he had authorized the satirical theme in the beginning with confidence that the light-hearted approach would be understood.

However, a university student who said he served in Korea and had buddies killed by the Communists found the stunt no laughing matter.

... Dean Burnside said he understood a red star dangling from a statue in the lobby of Tampa U. aroused the veteran student considerably.

The sign labeled the statue dancer "Glorious Hero Dancer" and depicted the star as a sort of immobile medal for the immobile waltzer.

Dean Burnside also asserted that there would be a change in dance decorations tonight to the extent that vodka labels would not appear on the bottles which had been planned as candleholders for the "Kaper."

Among the signs jerked off the walls late Friday night were:

A picture of Jane Russell with the caption, "Glorious Red Hot Mama Is Coming to TKE's Kommunist Kaper."

A poster says, "Is Better Come to Kommunist Kaper or Be Liquidated."

A Russian hangman holding an oversized executioner's axe saying, "Is Not Axing You Twice. Come to TKE's Kommunist Kaper."

A huge banner with the inscription: "Join the 'Party'—TKE's Kommunist Kaper."

A sign on the goat of the statue of Esmeralda (on campus) saying, "Is Not Red Herring—Is Hero Goat."

Fraternity members told *The Tribune* they were holding a meeting at the school Friday night when they were told to take down the signs.

"We didn't have any choice," one TKE complained.

He said at least members had served in Korea and had buddies killed, too, but

they had not objected to the dance theme.

He characterized the fraternity as wholly composed of "ex-GI's."

The dance will go on as scheduled tonight at the university, but without any hints of Communism, the dean of men declared. It will follow the Troy State football game. . . . —*Tampa (Florida) Tribune*, Oct. 1, 1955.

"I AM for Adlai," he [Governor Harri-man] commented, "but I never said I would support him in a convention."—From the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, Oct. 15, 1955

REPRESENTATIVE Francis Walter (D, Pa.) said yesterday he will oppose any move to extend the Refugee Relief Act beyond its 1956 cutoff date.

He declared: "People in Europe just aren't eager to come to America any more because of the great prosperity over there . . ."—*International News Service*.

CITY COUNCILMAN Edward A. Cunningham said he would introduce a bill requiring candy stores, luncheonettes and ice cream parlors to obtain Police Dept. licenses. These places are breeding grounds for juvenile delinquency, he said. —*New York Post*, August 29, 1955.

GOV. LEO HOEGH, alarmed over sagging farm prices, meets Thursday with six other Midwest Republican governors in a "non-political session" aimed at finding ways to raise farm income. . . .

Hoegh, a lively newcomer who took office in January, refused to invite the Democratic governors of Missouri and Minnesota.

"To keep this thing non-political, we don't want anyone running for President here," he said.—*Baton Rouge Morning Advocat*, Oct. 13, 1955.

HERBERT V. PROCHNOW, the Chicago banker slated to become the new Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, leaves tonight for the Far East on a 3-week official "familiarization trip. . . .

He is a well known author, having written more than a dozen books on economics, religion and public speaking.

Among his writings are *The Public Speaker's Treasure Chest*, *The Toastmaster's Handbook*, *1001 Ways to Improve your Conversation and Speeches*, *Great Stories and Great Lives*, *Meditations on the Ten Commandments*, and *American Financial Institutions*. —*Washington Star*, September 29, 1955.



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